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Can ICTs Increase Tax? Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia 
 
Giulia Mascagni, Andualem T. Mengistu, and Firew B. Woldeyes 
 
 
Summary 
 
The widespread introduction of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and 
digitalised data management systems is one of the most important developments among African 
tax administrations in recent years. However, very little evidence is available on their 
effectiveness in practice, and how taxpayers respond to these changes. This paper starts filling 
this gap by reporting three sets of results from Ethiopia. 
 
First, we show that the available data is still not used to its full potential, despite modern ICT 
systems being in place. Second, we find that a technological innovation, the introduction of 
electronic sales registration machines (SRMs), had a positive impact on both tax revenue and 
the accuracy of tax records. However, taxpayers responded to the machines by simultaneously 
adjusting both reported income and deductible costs, thus reducing the potential revenue gains. 
Third, we use a letter experiment to show that the main mechanism through which the SRMs 
increase tax revenue is tax compliance, rather than any change in real business activity. 
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1 Introduction
African tax administrations have experienced rapid modernisation in the past two decades.
The digitalisation of tax records and widespread adoption of ICTs have been key features of
this process, not only for tax administration but also for public sector management more
broadly. Most countries today operate automated financial management, customs, and
159 out of 193 UN member states have automated tax systems (World Bank, 2016). One
example of this digital revolution in tax administration is e-filing, which allows taxpayers
in several low-income countries, including Ethiopia, to file their tax returns online. Some
countries, like Rwanda, allow micro taxpayers to file through their mobile phones. Another
example is the adoption of electronic sales registration machines (SRMs), which store
information on business transactions and communicate this directly to the tax authority.
They have already been introduced in several low-income countries, including Ethiopia,
Rwanda and Malawi, while others are considering their adoption, like Uganda.
Despite the widespread use of ICTs in tax administration and the radical changes they
have brought to the taxpaying process, there is very little evidence on their impact on
tax administration and tax compliance in low-income countries. One exception is a recent
report on e-filing in Tajikistan, which shows significant decreases in compliance costs and
increases in tax payments for some firms (Okunogbe and Pouliquen, 2017). As far as sales
registration machines (SRM) are concerned, two recent reports evaluated their impact in
Rwanda and Ethiopia. The former shows that SRMs resulted in an increase in tax payments
of about 8 percentage points. This average e↵ect, however, hides large di↵erences in terms
of sectors and firm size, with smaller firms experiencing larger increases (Eissa and Zeitlin,
2014). In the case of Ethiopia, Ali et al. (2015) looks at the impact of SRM adoption on
value added tax (VAT, both reported sales and tax), employment, and firms’ net entry. The
machines are found to lead to positive and significant increases in VAT and employment,
while they have no e↵ect on net entry.
Our paper builds on these results in three ways. First, we provide quasi-experimental
evidence on the impact of SRMs on both VAT and profit taxes, as well as checking any
impact on the accuracy and consistency of taxpayer self-reports across tax types. Second,
for each tax type, we investigate the machines’ e↵ect on outcomes on both the income and
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expense sides. We find that, while firms increase reported sales, they also make o↵setting
changes to expenses. Third, using a randomised control trial (RCT), we show that the main
mechanism leading from SRM adoption to higher tax revenue is increased tax compliance.
Our analysis is directly related to the recent literature on the key role of information
in modern tax administration. Successful revenue administrations in high- and middle-
income countries rely heavily on firms as collectors of both information (Kopczuk and
Slemrod, 2006) and tax revenue, through withholding of employment income tax (Kleven
et al., 2011). Third-party reporting, one example of which is income tax withholding,
has been shown to be very e↵ective in curbing opportunities for tax evasion in high- and
middle-income countries (Brockmeyer et al., 2016). As a result, the self-employed, for which
third-party reported information is not available, comply less than employees (Kleven et al.,
2011). Similarly, Pomeranz (2015) shows that evasion is higher in the parts of the VAT
chain that are not covered by the paper trail, namely sales to final consumers. However,
Carrillo et al. (2017) also show that the e↵ectiveness of third-party reporting can be severely
limited in contexts of low state capacity, where it cannot be complemented with more
traditional forms of enforcement, such as audits.
Besides its advantages for tax administrators, the availability of clear and verifiable
information on taxable transactions can a↵ect compliance through other channels. For
example, Naritomi (2016) shows that consumers can act as tax auditors when they are
given incentives to require receipts, with positive e↵ects on compliance. Along similar
lines, Kleven et al. (2009) argue that employees can contribute to tax enforcement through
whistleblowing threats, that are only possible thanks to accurate and accessible business
records. The availability of information can also encourage semi-voluntary compliance
through peer e↵ects and social norms, as evasion becomes more visible (e.g. not issuing a
receipt).
In addition, firms themselves may benefit from the technological innovation induced
by the revenue authority, such as the mandatory requirement to use sales registration
machines. A recent survey revealed that Ethiopian firms found SRMs particularly useful
for getting updated and easily available sales information and to reduce the opportunity
of theft by employees (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, the availability of accurate and
accessible tax records should reduce corruption and predatory behaviour by tax o cials,
8
as digitalised records make it possible to easily cross-check data for any particular firm
(Olken and Pande, 2011). Generally, better business records should make firms’ interactions
with tax o cials easier and less arbitrary, as well as helping to reduce compliance costs
(Okunogbe and Pouliquen, 2017).
A related literature has shown that ICTs can be highly e↵ective in other aspects of
public administration. Lewis-Faupel et al. (2016) evaluate the introduction of electronic
procurement in India and Indonesia, and find that it significantly improved the quality of
public contracts in both countries. Muralidharan et al. (2014) investigate the introduction
of smartcards used to pay beneficiaries of employment and pension programmes in India,
finding that they led to a faster, more predictable and less corrupt payment process.
Therefore, the introduction of ICTs is expected to bring about several benefits, includ-
ing and beyond increased tax revenue. However, the extent to which ICTs can realise
their full potential in low-income countries, where evasion is widespread and state capacity
generally low (Besley and Perrson, 2013), is still unclear. High evasion means that many
taxpayers are outside of the tax net altogether, while the tax administration has a strong
incentive to focus on those that are more visible and already in the tax net (Gordon and
Li, 2009). Moreover, limited capacity may result in the inability to make full use of data,
even if it is available in digital format. Anecdotal evidence shows that revenue authorities
in low-income countries often do not cross-check their tax records, even if it would be rel-
atively easy to do so (Kangave et al., 2016; Almunia et al., 2017). In this context, ICTs
may not yield their expected benefits on tax revenue and compliance, let alone the possible
spillover e↵ects along the value chain (Pomeranz, 2015).
Against this background, this paper reports three sets of results that start to fill the
research gap in the field of technological innovation in tax administration. First, we provide
evidence that the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) is not making full
use of the data that is already available to them, which is compatible with the presence of
severe capacity constraints. We find several discrepancies in taxpayers’ accounts that could
easily be detected by simple cross-checks. Second, we provide an evaluation of the impact
of SRMs on tax revenue and the accuracy of tax records. Despite having a positive e↵ect
on tax revenue, SRMs result in simultaneous adjustments to both firms’ reported income
and deductible costs, thus substantially reducing the potential revenue gains. We also find
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a positive e↵ect on the accuracy of firms’ reporting. Third, we use an RCT to test the
mechanism through which SRMs increase tax revenue. We show that the revenue increase
is mostly due to increases in compliance, rather than real changes in business activity. The
RCT also provides an opportunity to indirectly test the e↵ectiveness of SRMs. We show
that those who have already adopted them do not respond to an increase in the probability
of audit - therefore confirming higher compliance amongst SRM users.
2 Background and context
Ethiopia is one of the most populous and fastest growing countries in Africa. It is also one
of the poorest. With a tax-to-GDP ratio of less than 13 per cent, the country experiences a
large gap in its capacity to finance development e↵orts, which is partly filled by foreign aid
and borrowing. The low tax ratio is explained by widespread tax evasion, tax incentives
for investors and severe constraints in administrative capacity, amongst others. In recent
years the government of Ethiopia has been increasing its enforcement e↵orts, with the aim
of tackling evasion. It is against this background that SRMs were introduced with a new
law in 2007. SRM adoption was not linked to a specific tax type, although it was expected
to help compliance, particularly with the VAT. The VAT was introduced in 2002, and had
been slow in producing the expected revenue gains.
Implementation was slow after the 2007 law, partly because of changes in the tax
administration itself around the same time. Most notably, ERCA was established in 2008
as a result of the merger of three institutions previously in charge of tax and customs
administration.1 Partly as a result of this, actual implementation of the new SRM law
only started in 2008. Each business was legally required to have a machine installed at
their premises, through one of the suppliers certified by ERCA. Firms were expected to buy
the machine at their own cost.2 SRM adoption was compulsory for all firms, so they did not
have any legal option to avoid it or to voluntarily opt out. ERCA communicated to each
1Although ERCA was formally established in 2008, there was much institutional continuity with the
previous institutions in charge of tax administration, so this institutional change did not represent a major
disruption.
2The machine’s cost was between 5000 to 14000 birr in 2013.
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firm that they should get an SRM, according to the rollout plan discussed below. Once the
machine is installed, the firm is meant to bring the relevant receipt to its ERCA branch
o ce, as proof. Firms have generally complied with this process, as not doing so would
put them as risk of business closure. In principle, all firms that have an SRM should use
it for every transaction, including business-to-business, and without exemptions. Failure
to use the machine can result in harsh monetary penalties and even imprisonment, with a
serious risk of business closure.3 As far as our data is concerned, a business appears as an
adopter in ERCA’s database once it has installed an SRM.
The rollout started in the capital, Addis Ababa, and was planned to take place gradually
between 2008 and 2011, with other areas of the country to follow afterwards. The rollout of
SRMs was not randomised. VAT-registered businesses in the hospitality sector (i.e. hotels,
bars and restaurants) and large taxpayers came first, while others followed largely based on
the sector in which they operate. However, in practice the rollout process was quite chaotic
and ad hoc. The challenges were mainly related to ERCA’s administrative capacity, but
also to taxpayer resistance and technological problems related to a weak communication
infrastructure. As a result, the process su↵ered from several delays. As shown in section
3.2, the rollout process continued well beyond 2011, as many of the firms in our dataset
were still adopting the SRM in 2012, 2013 and 2014.
The main objective of the introduction of SRMs was to improve the quality of data
available at ERCA and, therefore, to increase enforcement amongst registered businesses.
All firms in the capital (and, later, all regions) were required to start using SRMs eventually,
except micro taxpayers.4 The key innovation introduced by SRMs was the ability to
digitally record data from each sale and transmit it to ERCA in real time. Besides better
data, the machines did not change anything else in the process of declaring or paying
taxes.5 Taxpayers are still required to file for VAT monthly, and for income taxes yearly.
Declarations for the latter are due within four or two months after the end of the tax year,
depending on the type of taxpayer.6 Most firms follow the Ethiopian fiscal year, which
3When there is a technical problem with the machine, the firm is given an o cial receipt book authorised
by ERCA. This can be used for a maximum of five days while the problem is being fixed.
4Firms in category A and B (i.e. above 100,000 birr, according to the tax laws of the time) were legally
mandated to use the machine, while those in Category C (below 100,000 birr) were not.
5For example, taxpayers’ returns have not been pre-populated with data from the machines.
6Category A taxpayers (turnover above 500,000 birr) are required to file within four months, while
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runs from July to June. Therefore the tax declaration for any year ending in June is due
between 8 July and 9 November.7 Usually all declarations in Ethiopia involve some contact
with tax o cials, either in the process of preparing the declaration, submitting it, or paying
the tax due. The frequency of contact with tax o cials did not change as a result of SRM
introduction. Similarly, there was no major tax reform in the period covered by our data;
the relevant tax laws for VAT and income taxes date back to 2002.
Therefore, the introduction of SRMs was largely an increase in enforcement capacity,
both because of the increased quantity and quality of data available at ERCA (e.g. to feed
into the risk management function), and because of the possible reallocation of resources
within ERCA from pure data entry jobs to more advanced tasks, such as audits. SRMs
were expected to increase tax revenue, lead to a more e↵ective tax administration and
promote better data management.
3 Design, data, and empirical methods
3.1 Research design
Our research design is based on two interrelated components: a quasi-experimental di↵erence-
in di↵erence (di↵-in-di↵) analysis and a letter experiment. With the former, we evaluate
primarily the e↵ect of the SRM on tax collection - while also looking in further detail at
o↵setting responses on the expense side and impact on the accuracy of reporting. Hav-
ing established that SRMs significantly increase tax revenue, we explore the mechanism
through which this e↵ect comes about. Tax compliance is an obvious candidate, as records
become more verifiable by the revenue authority and taxpayers may even experience lower
compliance costs thanks to the new technology (Okunogbe and Pouliquen, 2017). However,
the increases in reported income and tax may also be due to changes in the level of economic
activity. On the one hand, this could be the result of improved e ciency generated by bet-
category B taxpayers (turnover between 500,000 and 100,000 birr) are required to file within two months.
Source: Proclamation No. 286/2002.
7For simplicity, in this paper we refer, for example, to year 2013 to indicate the fiscal year from July
2013 to June 2014.
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ter business records and less leakage of firm profits, for example due to theft by employees.
In a recent survey, Ethiopian firms highlighted a number of benefits resulting from SRM
adoption, such as ‘less opportunity for theft’ (mentioned by 20 per cent of respondents),
‘updated and easily available sales information’ (22 per cent), ‘easy to comply with tax
requirements’ (17 per cent) and ‘better sales and inventory control’ (16 per cent) (World
Bank, 2015, p.26). On the other hand, the cost of the machine and increased enforcement
pressure might cause a reduction in economic activity, as firms face higher costs than they
did before (machine cost, maintenance, more tax payments). While the di↵-in-di↵ analysis
cannot shed light into the mechanism leading from SRM introduction to higher revenue,
the RCT can. The experiment involves a fairly standard intervention in the literature,
consisting of a letter sent to firms by the tax authority (more details in section 3.1.2).8
These letters increase taxpayers’ perceptions of the probability of being detected evading.
As such, they should generate increases in tax compliance only for those firms that were
not already compliant. Therefore, if the mechanism leading from the SRM to higher tax
is compliance, SRM users would not respond to the letter, while non-SRM users would. In
this context, the RCT serves both as an indirect test of the impact of the SRM and as a
test of the mechanism behind the machines’ e↵ectiveness (Ludwig et al., 2011; Pomeranz,
2015). This is particularly relevant in our case, since the policy itself was not randomised.
3.1.1 Di↵erence-in-di↵erence design
Our analysis starts with a di↵erence-in di↵erence analysis looking at the e↵ect of the SRM
on VAT and profit tax (the exact dependent variables we use are described in detail in
section 3.2). This initial analysis provides evidence that overall the machines were e↵ective
in increasing tax revenue. To explore this result further, we also explore two other sets of
outcome variables. First, we unpack the details of firms’ responses by looking separately at
sales (total income for profit taxes, and VAT sales for VAT) and expenses (total deductible
expenses for profit tax, and VAT inputs for VAT). This allows us to identify any o↵setting
changes that firms may make to their reported expenses, to compensate for higher reported
income. Second, we look at the e↵ect of SRMs on the accuracy of firms’ reporting, measured
by the discrepancy between two measures of turnover that are both reported by the firm,
8For a comprehensive review of the literature on tax experiments, see Mascagni (2017).
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one for VAT and the other for profit tax purposes (see section 3.2). To make the analysis
of VAT and profit tax comparable, all our main results are based on annual data. However,
monthly data is available for VAT, as all firms need to declare on a monthly basis for this
tax type (see section 3.2.1).
As mentioned in section 2, the introduction of SRMs was not randomised. However,
our di↵-in-di↵ estimation would still identify the SRM’s e↵ect if the key assumption of pre-
treatment parallel trends is satisfied. In other words, treated firms (SRM adopters) should
not have systematically di↵erent trends pre-adoption compared to un-treated firms (those
that have not yet started using the SRM). Note that di↵erences in firm characteristics that
are fixed in time, such as location or sector, do not threaten our identification strategy.
Given the importance of the parallel trend assumption, we check it in three di↵erent ways.
First, we investigated the details of SRM rollout, paying particular attention to any
possible link between adoption and time-varying firm-level variables, such as growth and
performance. We conducted several consultations with ERCA o cials and looked into the
details of the rollout plan and its practical implementation. We obtained no indication
that rollout could be linked to time-varying firm characteristics. Although in principle
the process was organised in clear rounds, in practice the challenges and delays during
implementation introduced an element of randomness in actual adoption (although we do
not claim random allocation of the SRM).
Second, we directly test the parallel trend assumption using both monthly and annual
data for VAT, while for income tax we rely only on annual data. The obvious challenge in
the case of annual data is the short time period available before adoption. However, we
can still rely on three years pre-adoption for the firms included in our sample (see section
3.2), so that the assumption can be tested also using annual data. Our tests do not reveal
any systematic di↵erence in pre-adoption trends (see section 3.3.1), therefore confirming
the validity of our identification strategy.
Third, we take particular care in selecting a sample of firms that are relatively ho-
mogeneous in terms of location and adoption period. For example, we exclude adopters
involved in the initial rounds of the rollout (see section 2), and we only consider firms
registered in Addis Ababa. Section 3.2 reports more details on these sample restrictions
and on the types of firms included in this study. However, it must be stressed that our
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identification strategy would only be threatened if those firms have significantly di↵erent
trends before adoption, while our model can deal with di↵erences in the level. For exam-
ple, we can compare firms of di↵erent size as long as they have a similar growth trajectory
pre-adoption.
3.1.2 Letter experiment design
This component of our analysis relies on an intervention that was carried out as part of a
separate study (Shimeles et al., 2017). This RCT involved about 5,400 taxpayers, which
were randomly allocated to one of two treatment groups or to a control group.9 The treat-
ments are letters, with two alternative contents that were meant to potentially stimulate
compliance: one based on persuasion and one on deterrence. Treatment allocation was
based on stratified randomisation using location and sector as strata.10 All taxpayers in-
volved in the study are firms, both corporations and non-incorporated businesses that are
registered in one of the five main business districts of the capital: Addis Ketema, Bole,
Kirkos, Gulele and Nifas-Silk-Lafto.11 In line with the tax experiments literature, the
letters were sent by ERCA, not by the research team, and signed by the manager of the
relevant ERCA branch. They were delivered in person by ERCA representatives to treated
businesses between June and August 2014, which corresponds with the end of the financial
year and the beginning of the declaration period for income taxes.12 Therefore, the baseline
9There are ten sub-cities in Addis Ababa, out of which only five were selected for the original study.
Three sub-cities are business areas, while the other two are more residential areas. There are more than
86,000 firms that are registered and keep books of account in the five sub-cities (excluding government
enterprises and institutions). For the RCT, about 1,350 taxpayers were selected from each of the three sub-
cities in the business areas, and 1350 firms in total from the two sub-cities considered mainly residential.
The sampling frame is the universe of taxpayers located in the five sub-cities in Addis Ababa, according to
a list provided by the relevant ERCA branches. Taxpayers were grouped into three broad sectors and an
equal numbers of taxpayers were selected from each using simple random sampling.
10The sector variable distinguishes between wholesalers, other services, and manufacturing and agro-
processing. The location variable is based on five districts of Addis Ababa.
11The selection of the sub-cities is based on the authors’ (Shimeles et al., 2017) discussions with the law
enforcement directorate of ERCA. They have covered the three sub-cities known to have a high concentration
of business activities and two sub-cities that represent businesses in mainly residential sub-cities.
12The ERCA representatives are enumerators who were recruited specifically for this purpose, and were
given orientation by o cials from ERCA.
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declaration is the one for fiscal year 2012, while the post-treatment period is 2013.13 All
these aspects of the RCT design are largely in line with similar field experiments on tax
compliance (Mascagni, 2017).
The original study (Shimeles et al., 2017) had two two main objectives. First, the
authors wanted to check whether Ethiopian taxpayers are more responsive to coercion or
persuasion. To do this, they investigated the e↵ectiveness of two separate treatment letters.
The coercion letter informed taxpayers that ERCA is aware that many businesses are not
fully compliant, and stressed the existence of audits and penalties to deal with tax evasion.
The persuasion letter instead focussed on the civic duty to pay taxes, and their importance
in contributing to the country’s development, including flagship projects financed entirely
through domestic revenue, such as the Renaissance Dam. The original version of both
letters is in Amharic – an English translation is reported in the Appendix. The results
show that both letters have a large and significant e↵ect on reported tax, ranging from 32
per cent to 38 per cent. However, the coe cients of the two treatments are not statistically
di↵erent from each other, suggesting that receiving any letter from the revenue authority
increases compliance. This finding is in line with the literature from low- and middle-
income countries, where receiving any letter from the tax authority is quite uncommon,
and might be perceived as a deterrence intervention (Mascagni et al., 2017; Del Carpio,
2014; Ortega and Scartascini, 2016). Second, having found significant treatment e↵ects,
the authors explore whether they lasted one year after the intervention was implemented.
They find that taxpayers largely regress to their previous compliance behaviour, as the
short-term e↵ect almost entirely disappears the following year. Again, this is in line with
the very scant literature on the long-term e↵ects of letter experiments (Manoli and Turner,
2014).
Our paper exploits the letter intervention from this RCT as an exogenous variation in
the probability of being detected in evading taxes. This variation should increase com-
pliance if taxpayers were not already compliant before the intervention.14 Note that the
13The intervention was implemented in the declaration period for fiscal year 2013 (i.e. 2013/14). As a
result, it a↵ects only reporting behaviour, since all economic activity for that fiscal year is complete by the
time the treatment is administered.
14This is true under the plausible assumption that taxpayers would not pay more than the amount they
should pay if they were fully compliant, so the letter is only e↵ective when evasion is present and there is
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response elicited by the letter is attributed to increases in compliance (i.e. reporting re-
sponse), rather than real business activity (i.e. real response), since taxpayers receive the
letter once the economic activity for the year has already taken place. In this context, we
use this RCT as a mechanism experiment to explain the relationship between introduction
of SRM and increased tax. While the di↵-in-di↵ analysis shows that such relationship
exists, it cannot identify the mechanism through which it occurs. If the observed increase
in tax is due to better compliance, then we expect SRM users not to respond to the letter
intervention, since they have already adjusted their compliance as a result of SRM adop-
tion. On the other hand, non-SRM users should respond more than those who have already
adopted the SRM, as they are still less compliant. In other words, if the SRM’s e↵ect on tax
revenue is due to an increase in compliance, those who have adopted it should not respond
to successive deterrence interventions - or respond less than non-adopters. By testing the
di↵erence in taxpayers’ response to the letter between SRM users and non-users, the RCT
also provides a useful indirect test for the e↵ectiveness of the SRM (Ludwig et al., 2011;
Pomeranz, 2015)).
In the di↵-in-di↵ analysis we look at the SRM’s e↵ect on outcomes related both to
VAT and income tax. By doing this, we can make the RCT results consistent with the
di↵-in-di↵ ones, although the RCT intervention focussed more specifically on income taxes
(see letters in Appendix).
3.2 Data
All data used in this study come from administrative records from firms’ tax returns. These
are firm-level data routinely collected by ERCA in the process of tax collection. The data
is available in the same temporal dimension as the relevant declaration: monthly for VAT
and yearly for profit taxes. Although we use the monthly VAT data to test the parallel
trend assumption and for di↵-in-di↵ robustness, our main results are all based on yearly
data. In the case of VAT, the data was annualised simply by adding up the declarations for
all months in the year, calculated from July to June to keep consistency with the financial
year used for income tax declarations.
a margin to increase compliance.
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Our dataset is a panel covering five years, from 2010 to 2014.15 Although some data
prior to 2010 is available, it does not cover the universe of un-incorporated firms. This is
largely due to the extension, in 2010, of the data management system (SIGTAS) to non-
incorporated firms, while corporations were already captured in the system. The process
of migrating firms to SIGTAS started with VAT-registered firms, and was then completed
with the remaining ones. As a result, the data for 2010 is complete for VAT-registered
firms, but not for others. Therefore, the VAT analysis uses one more year (2010) than
the analysis of income taxes, which starts in 2011. In addition, the sample is restricted to
those firms that start using the machine sometime between 2011 and 2014.
We use all years of data for the di↵-in-di↵ (see section 3.3.1), while for the RCT we
simply use the baseline (2012) and the post-treatment period (2013).
As far as SRM adoption is concerned, we have data on the exact date of adoption for
each firm, which is used to generate a dummy variable for users (0 for non-users). Since
the main results are based on yearly data, we consider a firm as an adopter in any given
year if they had the machine for at least six months out of twelve. Since the fiscal year
starts on 8 July, a firm would need to adopt before January of the following year to be
considered a user. This definition is obviously simpler with monthly data, as the SRM
dummy simply switches on in the month of adoption. Table 1 reports the sample by year,
confirming that the rollout continued throughout our data period. It also shows that the
number of observations for VAT taxpayers is lower, which is expected because not all firms
included in the dataset are required to register for VAT (see section 2).16
Our dataset contains all firms that are registered with ERCA and file tax declarations,
except micro taxpayers.17 We restrict the sample to firms registered in Addis, because
both the SRM rollout in the relevant period and the RCT focussed on the capital. We
also exclude all taxpayers registered in the large taxpayers’ o ce (LTO) and state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), both for the di↵-in-di↵ and the RCT. These taxpayers are generally
15These correspond to years 2010/11 and 2014/15 in the Gregorian calendar.
16Category B taxpayers (turnover between 100,000 and 500,000 birr) are included in our dataset, but
they are not required to register for VAT. The VAT registration threshold is 500,000 birr, therefore a↵ecting
only Category A (firms with turnover above 500,000 birr).
17Our dataset includes all Category A (turnover above 500,000 birr) and B (turnover between 100,000
and 500,000 birr) taxpayers, while it excludes category C ones (below 100,000 birr).
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Table 1: Number of firms in the income tax sample
Fiscal year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
VAT payers
Number of firms 3226 5411 9401 11931 13011
Number of adopters 0 1670 3171 6471 8102
All firms
Number of firms 15749 23002 29001 29814
Number of adopters 0 8121 17453 23206
more compliant, and they would be excluded from our sample anyway because they adopted
either before or after the relevant period covered here.18 While the di↵-in-di↵ uses the full
population of eligible firms, the RCT is restricted to those who were selected to take part
in the experiment (see section 3.1.2 and 3.3.2).
As far as the dependent variables are concerned, we use two sets of variables, both
of which are calculated for VAT and for income tax separately. The first set is tax due
(for VAT and income taxes), transformed in log. The second set (again for both VAT
and income tax) is a dummy variable capturing the probability of filing a return with a
positive tax liability. This aspect is particularly relevant in Ethiopia, due to the relatively
large proportion of taxpayers with zero tax liability. Some of these are nil-filers, namely
taxpayers that declare zero turnover, while others are firms for which expenses are higher
than sales (especially for income taxes). Although the phenomenon of nil-filers is found
in other African countries, the reasons behind it are still unclear (Mascagni et al., 2017;
Almunia et al., 2017). Since in principle the machines can a↵ect both sets of outcomes, we
include both of them in all components of our analysis.
In Appendix B we report the key summary statistics for the main variables used in our
analysis.
18LTO was the first to adopt, while SOEs came towards the end.
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3.2.1 Accuracy of taxpayer reports
We measure the accuracy of taxpayers’ reports by investigating the discrepancy between
turnover as reported for VAT and income tax purposes. In addition to serving as a depen-
dent variable, our measure of accuracy provides some interesting evidence of the extent to
which the potential of administrative data in low-income countries remains untapped. This
section reports some descriptive statistics on taxpayer reports’ accuracy, before describing
the empirical framework.
In theory, there is no reason why taxpayers should report a di↵erent value of turnover
for the two tax types. Turnover as reported on both declarations is used to compute
taxes (either VAT or profit tax), so it always has a potential monetary consequence for
taxpayers that, in turn, may want to under-report to decrease their tax liability. However,
the VAT rate (15 per cent) is applied directly on sales, while the profit tax rate is applied on
taxable income, which is turnover minus deductible expenses. In this sense, the monetary
gain from under-reporting turnover in the VAT declaration might be greater compared
to under-reporting in the income tax declaration, where turnover has a more indirect
relationship with taxes, and where the latter can be reduced more safely by inflating
deductible expenses. While input costs also reduce tax liability in the case of VAT, through
refund claims, the self-enforcement mechanism of VAT means that, in practice, it would
be harder to inflate input costs for VAT purposes than for profit tax purposes.
In terms of the measurement of our turnover variable, we are comparing like with like
across declarations: total sales on both sides. Importantly, we take total sales for VAT
declarations and not VAT sales. Although there are VAT exemptions and zero-rated goods,
firms are still required to declare all the relevant amounts in the tax declaration. Although
the two measures of turnover should be comparable according to the law, we still expect
some mistakes and some level of misinterpretation of the law. To avoid picking up rounding
errors and small mistakes, we calculate discrepancies with a margin of error of 200 birr. We
consider any small discrepancy below 200 birr to be equal to zero. Still, if firms mistakenly
do not report exempted sales in their VAT declaration, and those sales are greater than
our margin of error, then we would observe a discrepancy where turnover in the income
tax declaration is greater than in the VAT declaration.
Table 2 shows three relevant metrics on accuracy, for firms included in our sample
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according to the criteria explained in section 3.2. The first column reports how frequently
discrepancies occur, that is the share of total declarations in our sample for which we
observe any discrepancy (greater than 200 birr, our margin of error). These numbers are
quite large: on average in all years, 60 per cent of firms reported discrepancies in turnover in
their declarations. The second column shows that, when a discrepancy occurs, it is more
likely to be due to under-reporting in the VAT declaration, compared with the income
tax declaration. This case captures about 66 per cent of discrepancies, on average in all
years. This observation is consistent with the idea mentioned above – that the monetary
gain from under-reporting turnover for VAT declaration purposes is greater than under-
reporting in the income tax declaration. However, an alternative explanation would be
firms’ misunderstanding of their legal obligation to report all sales, even if they are VAT
exempt, in their VAT declaration. With the data at hand, we are unable to distinguish
between these two alternative explanations. Finally, the third column shows how large
the discrepancy is, in cases where one exists at all. This is the absolute value of the ratio
between the discrepancy and the larger turnover as reported in the income tax declaration
or the VAT declaration.19 These figures show that discrepancies are not only frequent,
but also large – representing on average 48 per cent of the largest turnover declared.
While we cannot rule out that these discrepancies are, at least partly, due to mistakes and
misinterpretation of the law, their extent and depth suggest that evasion is likely to be part
of the explanation. If indeed the amount of the discrepancy could be recovered, so that
firms that under-report for VAT would pay the standard 15 per cent rate on the amount
of discrepancy, ERCA would have obtained an extra 634 million birr in VAT revenue in
2014 (about USD 23 million).20 However, there are at least three important caveats to this
figure. First, the discrepancy may be entirely due to exempted VAT sales, so that no tax
would be due on them. Second, it is likely that firms might increase their input claims when
forced to pay more VAT on outputs (as we document in section 4), so that the revenue
gains would be eroded by o↵setting refund claims. Third, the revenue gain calculation is
19Note that, by measuring the ratio using the largest turnover at the denominator, we are implicitly
assuming that the correct value is the greater one of the two.
20This is a rough calculation, where the amount of discrepancy, for each firm for which VAT turnover
is larger than income tax turnover, is multiplied by the VAT rate of 15 per cent. All the revenue gains
calculated this way are then added up, for 2014.
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based on the assumption that turnover reported in the income tax declaration is correct.
However firms may claim it was mistaken and try to revise it downwards. All these caveats
mean that the revenue gains may not materialise in practice.
Table 2: Discrepancies between turnover reported for income tax and VAT
Frequency of discrepancy VAT < income Size of discrepancy N
.
2010 58.00 71.5 49.4 1871
2011 61.1 70.3 49.6 3304
2012 59.2 67.5 46.2 5564
2013 60.4 63.0 44.6 7206
2014 60.8 65.7 49.1 7908
Finally, it is worth noting that taxpayers would only consciously report discordant
figures if they do not think the revenue authority stores the data to cross-check, or if they
do not believe that it has the capacity to do so. If the SRMs correct these perceptions, for
example by making taxpayers more aware of the data available to ERCA, we would expect
to observe a positive impact of SRMs on accuracy.
3.3 Empirical framework
Based on the research design and data described so far, the next two sections go into the
details of the empirical framework for both components of our analysis.
3.3.1 Di↵erence-in-di↵erence
In the di↵-in-di↵ component we need to observe firms before SRM adoption, to check for
the parallel trend assumption, as well as afterwards. To this aim, treated firms in our
data are only those that adopted between 2011 and 2014. By doing this, we exclude early
adopters. We obtain a sample of firms that have a minimum of two data points prior to
adoption and at least one afterwards (including the adoption year). Control firms are those
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who had not yet adopted the machine in the relevant period.
Our estimation follows a rather standard di↵-in-di↵ methodology, with staggered treat-
ment. The standard equation is as follows, where  i are firm fixed e↵ects and 't is a time
fixed e↵ect. SRM is a dummy that switches on in the year of adoption (see section 3.2).
The dependent variable in our case is either tax due or the probability of declaring positive,
as described in section 3.2. In the latter case, we report results from the linear probability
model, as it is easier to estimate a fixed e↵ects model using this methodology.
Yit = ↵+  SRMit + 't +  i + ✏it (1)
This equation can identify the SRM treatment’s e↵ect on tax due after adoption, pro-
vided that the parallel trend assumption is satisfied. To test this assumption, we estimate
the following equation, where we include years both before (Pre variables) and after adop-
tion (Post variables), the latter including the year of adoption. As in the previous equation,
 i are firm fixed e↵ects and 't is a time fixed e↵ect, while the dependent variable is tax
due. SRMit+k is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is k periods before(after) adoption in
period t.
Yit = ↵+
2X
k= 3
 kSRMit+k + 't +  i + ✏it (2)
If there is no parallel trend, we expect the Pre-adoption dummies not to be statistically
significant. On the other hand, the significance of the Post-adoption dummies provides a
first indication of the e↵ectiveness of the machine. Figures 1 and 2 plot the coe cients from
this regression, both for net VAT and profit tax. They confirm that there is no statistically
significant di↵erence between users and non-users before adoption. Moreover, we report in
Appendix C the same test based on monthly data for VAT. The same result holds.
3.3.2 Letter experiment: implementation and empirical framework
The empirical framework for the RCT is rather straightforward, as the letter intervention
was randomised. However, it is worth mentioning at the outset that the RCT was not
designed to look at heterogeneous e↵ect of letters between adopters and non-adopters.
The underlying assumption of using the RCT to compare these two groups is that they
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Figure 1: Dynamic response of VAT declarations for machine adoption - annual data
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Figure 2: Dynamic response of income tax declarations for machine adoption
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would have reacted the same way to the letter intervention, in absence of the machine. In
other words, there should be no pre-existing di↵erence in compliance before adoption. We
cannot directly test this assumption, so this remains a caveat to our results. However, the
details on SRM rollout described in section 2 give us some confidence that the extent of
tax compliance was not a relevant criterion to decide on the timing of adoption, especially
not in the later stages of the process (i.e. 2012 and 2013, the relevant years for the RCT).
Moreover, there were at least two challenges in the RCT’s implementation. The first
one is that the randomisation was done on a list of taxpayers, provided by the ERCA main
o ce, which included only information on sectors and sub-cities for all taxpayers registered
in Addis Ababa. Although this still made it possible to randomise based on the sector and
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location strata, at the design stage there was no information on tax declarations prior to
the treatment. Therefore, about 25 per cent of the taxpayers included in the treatment
plan (either in the treatments or in the control groups) failed to declare at all for 2013. This
proportion is larger for VAT declarations (42 per cent), which could be expected since the
RCT focussed particularly on income taxes. As a result, we are left with a sample of 4,051
taxpayers for income tax and 3,151 for VAT. Since some of the taxpayers included in the
RCT reported zero tax (see section 3.2), in the regression focussing on those with positive
tax we have an even smaller sample. Importantly, there is no significant di↵erence in means
between taxpayers included in the RCT sample and those in the broader population, for
any of the following variables: VAT sales, VAT liability, turnover reported for income tax,
and income tax liability.
The second challenge is related to compliance with the treatment, which, as with many
other policy experiments, could not be mandated. Amongst those who declared at all for
income tax, about 75 per cent of those assigned to a treatment group actually received
the letter. Although we have information on who received the treatment and who did
not, we prefer the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates, as they take into account a level of
non-compliance that is inherent in all policy interventions. All our results are ITT e↵ects.
Since this component explores particularly the comparison between two sub-groups
(SRM users and non-users) of an already limited sample, our main results focus on the e↵ect
of receiving any letter. In other words, we pool the coercion and persuasion treatments
together. This choice is supported by the findings of the main study, where the two
treatments are not found to have statistically di↵erent e↵ects. In fact, the authors recognise
that they cannot rule out the possibility that even the persuasion treatment was perceived
with an element of deterrence (Shimeles et al., 2017). To make sure, we repeated the
regression with disaggregated treatments, and the two coe cients on the letters are indeed
largely comparable in magnitude and statistically the same. Although our main results
use the pooled treatments, we also explore the e↵ect of disaggregated treatments - finding
again that there is no significant di↵erence between the two.
As mentioned in section 3.1.2, the stratified randomisation was successful and there
were no statistically significant di↵erences in any of the dependent variables at baseline
(2012). We perform balance tests on the whole sample of available taxpayers, using only
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those with positive tax, and separately by SRM users and non-users. In all cases, both tax
and turnover were balanced at baseline, both for VAT and income tax (see Appendix table
A3).
We estimate the following equation:
Taxi = ↵+  Treatment+  Xi + ui (3)
Xi is a vector of firm-specific control variables, including firms’ sector, organisational
form (corporation or unincorporated business) and location (tax centres). The e↵ect of
the letter is captured by the coe cient  . As in the di↵-in-di↵ analysis, the dependent
variable is either tax due, in which case we use OLS for estimation, or the probability of
reporting positive tax, in which case we use a probit model (reporting marginal e↵ects).
In both cases, the dependent variable is tax in the post-treatment period (2013).
4 Results
4.1 Di↵-in-di↵ results
Table 3 reports results for the di↵-in-di↵ estimation for VAT. It includes only taxpayers
with positive net VAT, and reports the e↵ect of the SRM on the log of three VAT variables.
The first one is VAT sales, which are shown to increase by 87 per cent as a result of adoption
of the SRM. However, as shown in the second column, reported inputs also increase and
proportionally more than sales – about 150 per cent. The net result on VAT is still positive,
with a 70 per cent increase in net VAT, but less than proportional compared to VAT sales.
All these e↵ects are statistically significant and economically large. Some degree of cost
adjustment is expected when reported sales increase. That is due to firms’ desire to appear
small, therefore underreporting both sales and costs (Carrillo et al., 2017). However, in our
case, costs increase almost twice as much as sales. Besides eroding the potential revenue
benefits of the SRM, this large increase in inputs, compared to sales, is hard to reconcile
with a real economic response. It may be that taxpayers make large o↵setting adjustments
to costs because they know this is a harder margin for ERCA to verify. This would be
consistent with findings in the literature, where taxpayers are especially found to inflate
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less verifiable expenses (Mascagni and Mengistu, 2016; Slemrod et al., 2015; Carrillo et al.,
2017).
We find a similar result for income taxes, as reported in Table 4. While SRM adoption
increases reported turnover by about 27 per cent, taxpayers also respond by almost doubling
the value of deductible expenses (93 per cent), thus managing to increase tax liability by
only 18 per cent. Although the taxpayers’ response is qualitatively similar for VAT and
income tax, it is smaller in magnitude for the latter. This may be due to the self-enforcing
nature of the VAT (Pomeranz, 2015) or to the (mis-)perception that SRMs were mostly
introduced for VAT enforcement purposes. However, once we estimate the income tax
e↵ects only on VAT-registered taxpayers, the e↵ect sizes between VAT and income tax
are much more aligned (see Table A4 in Appendix). This suggests that any di↵erence
in magnitude is due more to the sample than to the tax type. In other words, VAT
payers respond more to the introduction of SRMs. One possible explanation for the larger
response is that, for VAT refund in Ethiopia, tax authorities check the financial statements
of both transacting parties, which creates a paper trail – increasing the probability of
detection. The SRM, by making the process of checking transactions much easier, increases
the detection probability.
Table 3: The e↵ect of SRMs on VAT declaration: annual data and positive VAT declaration
VAT sale VAT input Net VAT
SRM 0.870⇤⇤⇤ 1.493⇤⇤⇤ 0.707⇤⇤⇤
[0.027] [0.069] [0.032]
Year fixed e↵ect Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Number of observations 26938 26938 26938
Number of firms 13566 13566 13566
Adjusted R2 .2 .1 .12
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 5 looks at the SRMs’ e↵ect on the accuracy of taxpayer self-reports, which has
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Table 4: The e↵ect of SRMs on profit tax declaration: positive tax
sale cost proftax
SRM 0.275⇤⇤⇤ 0.935⇤⇤⇤ 0.177⇤⇤⇤
[0.012] [0.042] [0.014]
year fixed e↵ect Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed e↵ects
Number of observations 77256 77256 77256
Number of firms 30493 30493 30493
Adjusted R2 .14 .11 .065
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
been shown to be relatively poor in Ethiopia (see section 3.2.1). Both in the case of
turnover and costs, the absolute amount of the discrepancy more than halves as a result of
SRM adoption (respectively, 55 per cent and 60 per cent).21 This e↵ect may be related to
the availability of more accurate business records, thanks to the SRM, or to an increased
perception of detection for misreporting. Since the main role of the machine is to report
data directly to ERCA and to facilitate its use for tax enforcement, it is indeed a rational
response for taxpayers to improve the accuracy of their own reports. Importantly, these
results suggest that discrepancies are related to non-compliance, rather than being due to
any legitimate reason.
Finally, we look at the probability of reporting positive amounts of turnover and tax
liability, as well as costs, this time including all firms. Table 6 shows a positive e↵ect of
the SRM on all these variables for VAT. Table 7 shows increased probability of declaring
positive amounts of turnover and tax liability, as well as costs, for income tax purposes for
all income tax payers. However, the e↵ects are relatively modest. While the probability of
reporting positive VAT sales and tax increases by 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively,
the same figures for income tax are 8 per cent and 5 per cent. But these figures increase
21Note that costs for income tax and VAT inputs should, in principle, coincide because we are using
total costs from the VAT declaration, not only VAT deductible ones.
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Table 5: The e↵ect of SRM on accuracy
Sale Discrepancy Cost Discreancy
SRM -0.524⇤⇤⇤ -0.578⇤⇤⇤
[0.065] [0.080]
Year fixed e↵ect yes yes
Firm fixed e↵ects yes yes
Number of observations 42980 42980
Number of firms 18829 18829
Adjusted R2 .0071 .0054
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
to 13 per cent and 12 per cent when we look at income tax variables for the sub-sample of
VAT registered firms (see Table A5 in Appendix). This more modest response is consistent
with the persistence of nil-filing observed elsewhere in the literature (Mascagni et al., 2017;
Shimeles et al., 2017).
Table 6: The e↵ect of SRMs on the probability of positive VAT declaration: annual data
VAT sale>0 VAT input>0 VAT declared >0
SRM 0.137⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.154⇤⇤⇤
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
Year fixed e↵ect yes yes yes
Firm fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Number of observations 42980 42980 42980
Number of firms 18829 18829 18829
Adjusted R2 .04 .033 .041
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 7: The e↵ect of SRMs on the probability of declaring positive amounts
sale>0 cost>0 proftax>0
SRM 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
year fixed e↵ect yes yes yes
Firm fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Number of observations 97566 97566 97566
Number of firms 35469 35469 35469
Adjusted R2 .022 .079 .0037
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
4.2 RCT results
Despite the o↵setting cost adjustments, the di↵-in-di↵ results still show large increases in
tax revenue as a result of SRM introduction. Are these results attributable to compliance,
or to real increases in economic activity? The results in Table 8 strongly suggest it is
the former. We start from income taxes, as this was the main focus of the original study
(Shimeles et al., 2017). Overall, the letter treatment has a positive and significant e↵ect
on the income tax liability, which is attributable to an increase in compliance of about 16
per cent compared to the control group. When we look at the sub-group of non-SRM users
(column 2), this e↵ect almost doubles, to over 30 per cent, and becomes more significant.22
Instead, for those who already adopted the machine, the letter has no e↵ect, consistent
with the idea that they may already be more compliant. Column 4 confirms the same
result using interaction terms between the treatment and the SRM. Consistent with the
previous results, it shows that the treatment and the interaction term cancel each other
out, thus resulting in no treatment e↵ect for SRM users.
22We have also tried to estimate the treatment e↵ects separately for persuasion and deterrence, for non-
users. Both treatment e↵ects are significant but not statistically di↵erent from each other, as in the original
study (Shimeles et al., 2017). These results are available upon request.
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Table 8: Treatment e↵ects: main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All non-SRM SRM All
Treatment 0.160⇤ 0.304⇤⇤ -0.017 0.258⇤
(0.078) (0.117) (0.100) (0.101)
SRM user 0.816⇤⇤⇤
(0.105)
Treat*SRM -0.159⇤
(0.076)
Observations 2722 1248 1474 2722
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: log of income tax due.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Turning to VAT, Table 9 shows that the treatment e↵ects disappear when we consider
VAT net tax as an outcome variable. Despite being non-significant, the results in column 2
are qualitatively the same as the ones from Table 8, showing that the interaction between
treatment and SRM reduces the treatment e↵ect. The results on sub-groups, while being
very imprecisely estimated, are also in line with the findings on income tax – with only non-
users having a positive (though non-significant) treatment e↵ect. The weaker results on
VAT may be due to two reasons. First, the sample size is substantially smaller, especially
for the sub-groups of columns 3 and 4. Second, the letter was specifically targeted at
increasing income tax compliance, both in terms of its contents (see Appendix) and its
timing (see section 3.1.2). These reasons may largely explain the lack of a treatment e↵ect
on VAT. The results of Table 8 instead are largely confirmed when looking at income tax
variables for the sub-group of VAT registered taxpayers (see Appendix Table A6).
These RCT results, combined with the increase in revenue highlighted in the di↵-in-di↵
analysis of section 4.1, are highly suggestive that the main mechanism behind the observed
increase in tax is an improvement in taxpayer compliance. However, the caveat discussed in
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Table 9: Treatment e↵ects on VAT net tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all VAT TP all VAT TP VAT+non-SRM VAT+SRM
Treatment 0.063 0.131 -0.039 -0.252
(0.077) (0.111) (0.237) (0.133)
SRM user 0.255⇤
(0.107)
Treat*SRM -0.075
(0.077)
Observations 2586 2586 612 1231
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: log of VAT net tax due.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
section 3.3.2 still holds: we cannot rule out with certainty that adopters and non-adopters
would have reacted to the letter in the same way in absence of the machine.
Finally, as in the di↵-in-di↵, we estimate the treatment e↵ects on the probability of
declaring positive. Although the letter generally increases the probability of declaring
positive income tax for all taxpayers, this e↵ect is larger for taxpayers who have not yet
adopted the machine (see Table 10). This finding essentially mirrors the results of Table 6.
Consistent with the results on positive tax, there are no treatment e↵ects on the probability
of declaring positive VAT (see Appendix Table A7).
5 Robustness
We check the robustness of our results in two ways. First, we re-estimate all our equations
using monthly data for VAT, as more disaggregated data is available in this case. The
resulting coe cients are smaller but qualitatively similar: turnover increases, but reported
inputs increase by more, thus resulting in only a partial increase in tax (see Appendix
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Table 10: Treatment e↵ects: probability of declaring tax > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All non-SRM SRM All
Treatment 0.066⇤⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤ 0.055⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020)
SRM user 0.079⇤⇤⇤
(0.022)
Treat*SRM -0.012
(0.016)
Observations 4051 1867 2171 4051
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: probability of income tax > 0.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table A8).
Second, as far as the RCT is concerned, we check whether our results are robust to
taking firm size into account. Appendix Table 8 shows that SRM users have higher tax
liability. This is confirmed by t-tests of equal means of turnover and tax, showing that
SRM users are significantly larger, although this di↵erence is not large in magnitude. We
check whether the RCT results are a↵ected by size, by re-estimating the same equations
without the top quartile in terms of turnover and adding controls for size. The results,
reported in Appendix Table A9, are qualitatively similar. Although in one specification
there seems to be a treatment e↵ect also for SRM taxpayers, this e↵ect is still smaller than
for non-users, as expected.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the e↵ect of ICTs on tax compliance, in a literature
that so far has left this topic largely unexplored (section 1). Our results contribute to
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existing knowledge by showing that, although ICTs are highly e↵ective in increasing tax
compliance and revenue in Ethiopia, they are still severely limited by low state capacity
and by taxpayers’ strategic responses. More specifically, our analysis highlights three sets
of results, which can be summarised as follows.
First, the potential of existing technology and data systems remains largely untapped
in Ethiopia. Most administrative data collected by ERCA is already available in digital
format, and should therefore allow for easy cross-checks. However, we show that discrep-
ancies in taxpayers’ records are both frequent and large (section 3.2.1). The positive e↵ect
of SRMs on accuracy (section 4.1) suggests that these discrepancies are related to non-
compliance. Prior to the machine’s adoption, taxpayers may think ERCA is unable to
cross-check their records and detect mis-reporting. This perception is corrected after the
introduction of the machine, when accuracy improves.
Second, despite these limitations, the introduction of SRMs led to large increases in
tax revenue for both income taxes and VAT. These e↵ects are both statistically significant
and economically large (section 4.1). However, tax revenue does not increase to its full
potential, as taxpayers simultaneously adjust both turnover and expenses. Since the latter
increases more than turnover, for both income tax and VAT, the revenue gains are lower
than they would be without this (over-) adjustment.
Third, our RCT results show that the observed SRM e↵ects are largely due to increases
in compliance, rather than real economic activity. Firms that have already adopted the
machine generally do not respond to further increases in the probability of being detected,
while non-adopters respond significantly (section 4.2). These results are highly suggestive
that SRM users are already more compliant due to the machine. The RCT serves both as
a mechanism experiment, confirming compliance as the key mechanism, and as an indirect
test of the e↵ectiveness of SRMs – notwithstanding the caveats highlighted in sections 3.3.2
and 4.2.
Taken together, our results show that, while ICTs are highly e↵ective, they are no
silver bullet in contexts of limited state capacity. Realising their full potential requires
substantial investments to boost the revenue administration’s capacity to use the available
data and ICT systems. Taxpayers still respond to increases in enforcement by shifting
evasion to less enforced margins, like deductible expenses. Tackling tax evasion therefore
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requires a combination of technological innovation and measures to boost capacity and
traditional enforcement.
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Appendices
A Text of letters in English
Encouragement Letter
To . . .
Subject: Income Tax Declaration
The Growth and Transformation Plan sets out a vision of becoming a middle-income coun-
try, eradicating poverty and ensuring fair and equitable benefits to society. Achieving this
vision requires significant financial resources. The private sector engaged in agriculture,
manufacturing, foreign trade and infrastructure is highly expected to contribute to this
objective. Citizens, investors, development partners and the government need to work in
tandem.
The Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority believes that you, as a taxpayer, have
a big role to play in realising these national goals. Therefore, ERCA cordially asks you to
pay your taxes with pride, and support the growth and transformation plan.
ERCA would like to take this opportunity to inform you that it has the mandate to
reward outstanding taxpayers as per the income tax proclamation No 286/2002, article 85.
Moreover, it has a system of express tax refund and, for those engaged in import-export
business, it provides fast and e cient document inspection and examination of declaration.
ERCA, therefore, invites you to take this opportunity to play an exemplary role in paying
your taxes.
Regards,
Branch Manager
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Deterrence Letter
To . . .
Notice: Income Tax Declaration
Taxpayers play a vital role in enabling the e↵ective implementation of extensive devel-
opment goals put forward by the government. It is therefore the duty of taxpayers to
declare their income accurately and in a timely basis. We believe that you are paying your
taxes according to the laws of the country.
The Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority has carried out an assessment on the
tax declaration of taxpayers. The study has revealed that some taxpayers engage in con-
cealing their activities to avoid paying the true tax amount. The Authority has been
informing taxpayers of the presence of such discrepancies and encouraging them to make
improvements.
As you are well aware, the 2013/14 fiscal year will end in one month’s time and the
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority has finalised preparations to play its role in the
tax declaration process in an e↵ective manner. As per proclamation no. 286/2002, article
38, the authority can audit taxpayers as needed. With the knowledge that you could be one
of the taxpayers the Authority will audit, we advise you to declare your taxes truthfully
and on time.
It is the duty of taxpayer to pay the true tax and on time as a citizen. If a taxpayer
was found to understate his/her tax liability, she/he will be subjected to a penalty of 10
to 50 percent of the understated tax amount as per proclamation no. 286/2002, article 87.
Those who have submitted false documents will face criminal charges, which will result in
imprisonment of up to 15 years and 100,000 birr monetary penalty. Given these severe
consequences, the Authority warns taxpayers to declare their taxes truthfully to avoid
penalties and being held accountable for false declarations.
Regards,
Branch Manager
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B Summary statistics
Table A1: Summary statistics of VAT reports for the selected sample
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs.
TotalsaleVAT 132.89 764 3226 142.08 829 5411 131.27 746 9401 141.74 785 11931 183.36 1147 13011 151.43 906 42980
VATablesale 123.93 706 3226 134.34 794 5411 123.89 714 9401 133.59 738 11931 170.37 1070 13011 141.97 852 42980
VATonsale 18.59 106 3226 20.15 119 5411 18.58 107 9401 20.04 111 11931 25.56 160 13011 21.30 128 42980
TotalinputVAT 109.14 566 3226 110.03 632 5411 100.22 548 9401 114.78 783 11931 153.78 1293 13011 122.38 904 42980
VATableinput 97.49 462 3226 100.93 579 5411 94.12 530 9401 108.42 767 11931 146.89 1272 13011 115.18 879 42980
NetVAT 6.71 67 3226 7.07 64 5411 6.70 59 9401 6.74 49 11931 7.62 56 13011 7.04 57 42980
All mean and standard deviation are expressed in 10000 birr.
Table A2: Summary statistics of income tax reports for the selected sample
2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD Obs.
AnnualTurnOver 31.12 315 15749 43.93 294 23002 59.03 387 29001 91.96 755 29814 61.03 506 97566
Totalcost 27.97 320 15749 42.01 319 23002 56.66 389 29001 105.31 2989 29814 63.44 1678 97566
Profittax 1.09 10 15749 1.27 8 23002 1.77 20 29001 3.04 98 29814 1.93 56 97566
All mean and standard deviation are expressed in 10000 birr.
C Parallel trends test using monthly data for VAT
Figure 3: Dynamic response of VAT declarations for machine adoption - monthly data
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D Balance tests (RCT)
Table A3: Letter experiment: baseline summary statistics and balance of randomisation
All SRM Non-SRM
Control
(mean)
Di↵ Obs. Control
(mean)
Di↵ Obs. Control
(mean)
Di↵ Obs.
Log profit tax 6.596 -0.139 3820 6.726 -0.265 2233 6.426 0.069 1587
(0.16) (0.22) (0.23)
Log profit tax (positive
taxpayers)
9.464 -0.089 2682 9.960 -0.067 1540 8.862 -0.012 1142
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Log of turnover 10.826 -0.4213 3820 11.43 -0.472 2233 10.038 -0.247 1587
(0.17) (0.22) (0.27)
Log of turnover (posi-
tive taxpayers)
13.16 0.0346 2682 13.663 0.0804 1540 12.55 0.0778 1142
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
Log net VAT 9.3625 0.1522 2841 9.3822 0.0502 2018 9.3211 0.4369 823
(0.18) (0.21) (0.35)
Log net VAT (positive
taxpayers)
11.23 0.0483 2350 11.225 0.0636 1687 11.241 0.0013 663
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
Log sales VAT 11.545 0.1149 2841 11.585 0.0085 2018 11.46 0.4235 823
(0.21) (0.25) (0.40)
Log sales VAT (posi-
tive taxpayers)
13.7 -0.0049 2350 13.708 0.0293 1687 13.682 -0.0957 663
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
Services other than
wholesale (%) - profit
taxpayers
0.3309 -0.0285 3820 0.3234 -0.0122 2233 0.3406 -0.0537 1587
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Services other than
wholesale (%) - VAT
taxpayers
0.3267 0.0429 2841 0.3195 0.0341 2018 0.3416 0.0622 823
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
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E Additional di↵-in-di↵ results
Table A4: The e↵ect of SRMs on profit tax declaration: VAT registered an positive declaring
firms
sale cost proftax
SRM 0.815⇤⇤⇤ 1.474⇤⇤⇤ 0.746⇤⇤⇤
[0.023] [0.060] [0.030]
year fixed e↵ect Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed e↵ects
Number of observations 28875 28875 28875
Number of firms 13880 13880 13880
Adjusted R2 .24 .12 .12
Standard errors in brackets
“The results in column(1)-(3) are for all firms including those that declare zero sales.”
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table A5: The e↵ect of SRMs on the probability of declaring positive amount: VAT taxpayers
sale>0 cost>0 proftax>0
SRM 0.129⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
year fixed e↵ect Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed e↵ects
Number of observations 42980 42980 42980
Number of firms 18829 18829 18829
Adjusted R2 .033 .033 .018
Standard errors in brackets
“The results in column(1)-(3) are for all firms including those that declare zero sales.”
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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F Additional RCT results
Table A6: Treatment e↵ects: VAT sub-group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all VAT TP all VAT TP VAT+non-SRM VAT+SRM
Treatment 0.154 0.356⇤⇤ 0.374⇤ 0.030
(0.092) (0.134) (0.170) (0.108)
SRM user 0.205
(0.131)
Treat*SRM -0.206⇤
(0.092)
Observations 1843 1843 612 1231
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: log of income tax due.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table A7: Treatment e↵ects: probability of declaring VAT net tax > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All non-SRM SRM All
Treatment 0.008 0.049 -0.019 0.028
(0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019)
SRM user 0.088⇤⇤⇤
(0.019)
Treat*SRM -0.026
(0.014)
Observations 3138 1088 2042 3138
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: probability of VAT net tax¿0.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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G Additional robustness results
Table A8: SRM e↵ect on positive VAT declaring and the probability of declaring positive VAT:
monthly data
VAT sale VAT input Net VAT VAT sale>0 VAT input>0 VAT declared >0
SRM 0.503⇤⇤⇤ 0.612⇤⇤⇤ 0.433⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤
[0.024] [0.054] [0.025] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Time fixed e↵ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 71209 71209 71209 137320 137320 137320
Number of firms 3523 3523 3523 3631 3631 3631
Adjusted R2 .15 .041 .1 .016 .016 .0099
Standard errors in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table A9: Treatment e↵ects: results with size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
non-SRM SRM All non-SRM SRM All
Treatment 0.259⇤ -0.111 0.161 0.207⇤⇤ 0.081 0.231⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.098) (0.093) (0.079) (0.071) (0.067)
SRM user 0.816⇤⇤⇤ 0.243⇤⇤⇤
(0.099) (0.073)
Treat*SRM -0.106 -0.073
(0.072) (0.052)
Observations 972 928 1900 972 1474 2722
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: log of income tax due.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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